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Abstract 
Climate change impacts on societies and ecosystems are relatively new concerns in 
the water sector. A steadily growing literature emphasizes the need to reform water 
governance in order to make it more adaptive. In this contribution, I ask whether 
climate change adaptation can be considered as a new norm of policymaking and 
what this is implying for the governance of water. Building on the literature and on 
empirical material gathered from case studies, this chapter emphasizes the complex 
and erratic nature of adaptation policy processes, which may result in outputs that 
highly diverge from the positive expectations held in the literature and in international 
fora. 
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1 Introduction 
The way we deal with certain social problems at subnational scales is influenced by 
global trends in the values and prescriptions that shape collective responses (Bernstein 
and Cashore 2012). Such constructs can be referred to as common global norms, 
which we define as: “intersubjective understandings that constitute actors’ interests 
and identities, and create expectations as well as prescribe what appropriate behaviour 
ought to be” (Björkdahl 2002).  
Common global norms are sets of influential ideas that are used to frame domestic 
policies (Keohane and Goldstein). For instance, the call for integrated water resource 
management after the Rio summit of 1992 strongly influenced environmental 
policymaking in developed countries (Jordan, Wurzel, and Zito 2003). Old-fashioned 
command and control policies came under heavy criticism for being inefficient (Cole 
and Grossman 1999). As a result, voluntary and market-based instruments were 
widely introduced in environmental policy, notably in the form of tradable water 
rights (Dales 1968). Starting from the early 2000, integrated water resource 
management came to be seen as the best and unique way to achieve sustainable 
development in the water sector (Rahaman and Varis 2005). 
However widespread and dominant they might be, norms are not cast in stone. They 
evolve through time and may fade, sometimes very abruptly. As some authors suggest, 
we may very well be witnessing a form of paradigmatic shift in environmental 
thinking. The concept of sustainability might be ceding ground to that of climate 
change adaptation (Theys 2014). More specifically in the water sector, concerns 
about climate change are allegedly fueling a change of policy perspective from 
integrated management towards adaptive management (Engle et al. 2011).  
To what extent climate change adaptation (CCA) can be considered as a new global 
norm, and what this is implying for water governance, is a question that needs to be 
addressed. Climate change adaptation has indeed become one of the trendiest topics in 
international debates on water governance, and more generally, on environmental 
management. Until the early 2000’s, adapting to climate change was considered a 
taboo (Pielke et al. 2007 & Sarewitz, 2007). Reducing greenhouse gas emissions 
(GHGs) to mitigate global warming was originally defined as the priority of the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) of 1992. As 
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and when the political failure to limit the ever-growing GHG emissions grew patent, 
the attention of policymakers seemingly reorients from mitigation towards adaptation 
to the unavoidable symptoms of climate change.  
It is scientifically indisputable that climate change causes significant alterations of 
social-ecological systems and that forms of adaptation are necessary. Climate impacts 
affect the capacity of ecosystems to deliver goods and services of upmost importance 
for the development and livelihood of societies, for instance freshwater, arable land, 
or natural disaster regulation (Daily et al. 2009, Schröter et al. 2005). Adaptation is 
hence a matter of concern for a multitude of policy sectors such as water management, 
biodiversity, agriculture, spatial planning, health or economic development 
(Hallegatte 2009). In the water sector, climate risks are numerous, for instance: 
streamflow and water quality alteration, increased flood magnitude and frequency, 
biodiversity loss, or sea-level rise (Settele et al. 2014).  
The last IPCC report defines adaptation in a relative neutral way as: “the process of 
adjustment to actual or expected climate and its effects.” (IPCC 2014). In substance, 
CCA includes all to efforts to anticipate and prevent the effects of climate change, to 
reduce the magnitude of climate stimuli, but also to pool the risks, or even to bear 
some losses (Smit et al. 2001). Article 4.1 of the UNFCCC stipulates a duty to 
implement and report adaptation measures. To what concerns European countries, 
these have been supplemented by guidelines from the European commission 
(Commission of the European communities 2009, 2007). However, these legal 
requirements are very “soft” in nature (Dreyfus and Patt 2012), meaning their 
coercive power remains weak. 
Scientists working on adaptation have played a central role in setting adaptation on 
the international policy agenda (Agrawala 1998). This contributes to explain why the 
adaptation research community has mostly focused on the societal, economical or 
political barriers to the development of adaptation responses (Eisenack et al. 2014), 
rather than contributing to comprehensively analyze decision-making processes in 
relation to adaptation, or to evaluate their impacts (Biesbroek et al. 2015). If the 
literature generally advances the idea that climate vulnerable sectors must take stock 
of climate impacts in decision-making (Smit and Wandel 2006), only a few authors 
have discussed critically what this really implies for water governance (Becker, 
Huitema, and Aerts 2015, Huitema et al. 2009).  
 4 
In this chapter, I will address three key dimensions in relation to the potential impacts 
of climate adaptation for water governance. If adaptation has become a global 
common norm, then we should be witnessing a process of institutionalization within 
States (Bernstein and Cashore 2012), which I will first discuss. Second, norms are 
always based on a normative justification, namely a discourse on the moral and 
societal imperatives implying the appropriate actions (Björkdahl 2002). I will, 
therefore, try to elaborate on the normative content of adaptation. Third, a norm 
should provide with clear substantive prescriptions on the adequate behaviors to adopt 
(March and Olsen 1998). I will try to decipher, what the substantive implications of 
adaptation ought to be with regards to the water sector. And finally, I will conclude 
this chapter reflecting on how this discussion draws the shapes of a future research 
agenda on adaptive water governance. 
2 Adaptation institutionalization in water governance: integration & interplay 
management  
In order to be effective, soft norms stemming from the international level must find 
ways to influence collective behaviour at the domestic level. Beyond cultural 
channels of diffusion such as the standardized language used to depict collective 
problems and how to solve them (Johnston 2001), one of the most direct norms 
diffusion pathways is the direct legal translation in national constituencies (Bernstein 
and Cashore 2012). Another channel is their integration in less formal institutions 
such as private laws, social contracts or collective norms of behaviour (Adger et al. 
2013 Murphy, & Sweeney, 2013).  
Empirical studies have described how adaptation is being institutionalized in 
developed countries (Biesbroek et al. 2010, EEA 2014). The rise in importance of 
adaptation in policy discourses can hardly be disputed (Schipper 2006). Most States 
have incorporated adaptation in their policy framework, but in current practices, 
adaption is seldom developed as a stand-alone policy sector. A “mainstreaming” 
approach is said to predominate, which refers to an incremental process where 
adaptation is incorporated as a new layer in the existing institutional structure rather 
than through dedicated administrations and policies (Lesnikowski et al. 2015 Berrang-
Ford, & Heymann, 2015). If autonomous adaptation by private actors has been 
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observed (Tompkins et al. 2010), little evidence exists that climate impacts are yet 
systematically integrated in private decision-making. 
Adaptation mainstreaming as a process of institutional integration leads to complex 
settings of rules that some scholars refer to as “regimes” (Gerber et al. 2009 & Varone, 
2009, Jochim and May 2010). In these contexts, the challenge becomes to integrate 
and bring adaptation objectives in coherence with the existing set of rules and norms 
that already tend to mutually conflict. Such endeavour requires to manage the vertical 
interplay between various layers of institutional structures with heterogeneous 
attributes, and to deal with the horizontal interplay between regulations and norms 
with conflicting goals or effects (Vatn and Vedeld 2012, Young 2002). 
Institutional coordination has precisely been identified by the literature as one of the 
main factors that hamper adaptation development (Krysanova et al. 2010 Varela-
Ortega, & Schlüter, 2010). According to existing assessments, even recent pieces of 
legislation such as the European Water Framework Directive (WFD) of 2000 poorly 
integrate climate impacts into risk assessments and decision-making, although goal-
attainment by the WFD is clearly climate-sensitive (Brouwer, Rayner, and Huitema 
2013 2013, Wilby et al. 2006 Forrow, & Blackmore, 2006). 
Against similar backdrops, several authors proposed frameworks around the concept 
of “environmental policy integration”, originally in order to assess the progress of 
States in incorporating sustainability into their development policies (Knoepfel 1995, 
Lafferty and Hovden 2003). Many scholars working on environmental policy 
integration in the aftermath of the Rio conference simply assumed a normative tone 
regarding the need to give priority to sustainability in the management of policy 
interplay. These authors suggested that environmental concerns should be integrated 
vertically, in all layers of governance and at all stages of policymaking; and 
horizontally, through the coordination of environmental and non-environmental 
policy, as to “minimise contradictions between environmental and sectoral policies by 
giving principled priority to the former over the latter”; (Lafferty and Hovden 2003, 
9). 
By analogy, the same principle could apply to adaptation; in order to be effective, 
adaptation goals should be coherently articulated with and given priority over 
potentially rival policies and rules. The adaptation literature hence emphasizes the 
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need to better integrate adaptation in institutional frameworks, notably in the 
governance of water, and to make existing policies more supportive of adaptation 
(Urwin and Jordan 2008). However, under the current circumstances, it is relatively 
unclear how coherence is to be reached and to what extent adaptation should be 
prioritized over other policy objectives.  
Indeed, institutionalizing adaptation may produce erratic results. In the current 
context of soft obligations, high uncertainty with regards to climate impacts, and low 
public pressure on the climate issue, the institutional integration of adaptation is prone 
to symbolic policymaking (Gustafsson 1983), that is actions intended to demonstrate 
government activity on a given problem, but with no hope of contributing to its 
resolution. Adaptation often gives rise to a process of policy recycling or relabeling, 
by which already existing measures are given a second political life under the 
etiquette of “adaptation”. Dupuis (2015), for instance, demonstrates how the huge 
integrated watershed management program (NWDPRA) launched by the Indian 
government in 1991 was first framed as sustainable development policy, before being 
newly presented as an adaptation measure in 2008. 
Worse, when insufficiently coordinated with social welfare or environmental 
protection policies, institutionalizing adaptation in the water sector can lead to 
outcomes that are highly questionable in terms of legitimacy. The dam project of 
Sivens in the Tarn region of France is a sadly famous example of that. The project, 
financed by the water ministry, the EU and the Tarn department, was supposed to 
balance the effect of climate change on water availability to the benefit of farmers 
downstream of the Tescou river. The most important wetland of the region was to be 
flooded, however, even though it contained a rich biodiversity of about 94 protected 
species1. The launch of the deforestation work triggered uproar and protests, which 
peaked with the death of a 21 years old demonstrator. Two days later, an assessment 
commissioned by the National ministry of ecology strongly criticized the project 
(Conseil général de l'environnement et du développement durable 2014). The project 
was finally abandoned 2 months later, leaving the wetland ecologically damaged. The 
case of Sivens is certainly extreme, but must be considered as a cautionary tale about 
the fact that the lack of institutional coordination between adaptation and 
environmental conservation leads to unpredictable effects on the ground. Had the 
                                            
1 http://www.collectif-testet.org/31+la-zone-humide-du-testet.html 
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planning procedures integrated biodiversity and local people aspiration ahead in the 
process, alternative adaptation options with less dramatic consequences might have 
been advanced. 
The case of Sivens strongly reminds that adaptation is being institutionalized, but 
without a clear blueprint on how to articulate and prioritize with existing policies 
(Jordan and Lenschow 2010), which can lead to erratic results in case of deficient 
coordination.  
3 The normative content of adaptation: the attractiveness of polysemy 
Common global norms necessarily entail a form of teleology, that is a moral 
justification of the societal purpose or problems they where designed to address in the 
first place (Habermas 1998).  
At the ontological level, Eakins and al. (2009) consider that adaptation goals can be 
viewed through at least three different theoretical lenses: the risk-hazard literature 
(McCarthy et al. 2001 Dokken, & White, 2001), political economy (Adger and Kelly 
1999), and socio-ecological system theory (Gunderson and Holling 2002).  
These theoretical frames imply different priorities for adaptation goals in water 
governance. The risk-hazard approach focus primarily on physical exposure to 
climate impacts and involve straightforward risk reduction responses such as building 
dikes or giving more room to rivers (Füssel 2007). Political economy tends to adopt a 
more holistic approach, in which climate change impacts are just a factor that 
aggravates the deeply rooted social-economical vulnerabilities of people at risk 
(O'Brien, Sygna, and Haugen 2004). In this approach, reducing structural social 
inequities through empowerment and capacity building represents the cornerstone of 
adaptation policy. Finally, socio-ecological system theory rather puts the emphasize 
on water management systems that are flexible enough to absorb external shocks 
while retaining the same function and structure (Nelson, Adger, and Brown 2007 
2007). The point is here to build institutions that allow for adaptive management. 
Studies that systematically analyze and compare how these theoretical lenses diffuse 
into real world politics, and how they impact water management are still scarce 
(Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013, Eakin et al. 2009). More work is needed to identify 
which policy goals seem best to best work in what context as well as trade-offs and 
synergies. 
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Interestingly, adaptation seems to have generated an image far less accurate of the 
societal goals to be reached than the one to be avoided. The term “maladaptation” is 
used to designate these negative features. A plurality of interpretation certainly exist, 
(Magnan et al. 2016), but maladaptation designates primarily policy objectives that 
program large increases of GHG emissions (Hasson, Löfgrenb, and Visser 2010), 
contradict sustainability principles (Brown 2011, Eriksen et al. 2011), or lock in 
irreversible pathways (Hallegatte 2009). Other than the Sivens case, Barnett and al. 
(2010) demonstrate that the water policies designed by the municipality of Melbourne 
to deal with climate impacts such as declining rainfalls and water availability through 
means of desalinization and water transport largely increase GHG emissions, and 
disproportionately burden most vulnerable actors. By contrast, other studies show 
how adaptation programs that develop irrigation potential to fight against droughts 
and erratic rainfalls can positively affect the social welfare of vulnerable actors, but 
also contribute to groundwater depletion, thereby reinforcing the adverse impacts of 
climate change  (Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013).  
Hallegatte (2009) convincingly demonstrates that positive obligations can be derived 
from the concept of maladaptation. He suggests that decision in the water sector 
should be robust to climate uncertainty by planning soft options that are reversible. 
He calls for a strengthening of the precautionary principle, by using safety margins 
for defining stricter-than-necessary targets in order to account for the additional risks 
of climate change. All these policy advice revolves around the concept of low-regret 
or no-regret strategies, namely policy options that would yield benefits even in the 
absence of climate change (Wilby and Dessai 2010).  
Robust adaptation may seem the most policy-relevant way to frame adaptation goals. 
At the same time however, it carries a conservative tone and dilutes the specificities 
of adaptation. The precautionary approach emphasized to deal with the uncertainty 
carries the risk of excluding innovative and progressive measures designed to 
specifically address future climate change impacts. Robust adaptation therefore leads 
to a focus on the most proximate causes of climate vulnerability, and omits the 
systemic changes that might be needed in order to cope with future climate impacts of 
larger magnitude (Wise et al. 2014). 
It is also questionable whether robust adaptation adds any value to current water 
policies. The inclusion of safety margins in the design of flood prevention systems, 
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for instance, is not new per se. Similar advice was made to strengthen flood risk 
policies well before climate change became a policy issue (Burton, Kates, and White 
1978). These redundancies have raised the skepticism among scholars within the 
disaster risk reduction community about the novelty and added-value of adaptation 
(Mercer 2010). 
In reaction to the incrementalism and precautionary approach underlying robust 
adaptation, the recent literature, and notably the last IPCC report, emphasizes the need 
for transformational adaptation (Kates, Travis, and Wilbanks 2012, Klein et al. 2014, 
Preston, Dow, and Berkhout 2013). Transformational adaptation can be understood as 
the opposite image of robust adaptation. In answer to the risks of climate impacts of 
unpredictable magnitude, transformational adaptation are interventions of a 
paradigmatic nature that ambition to transfigure the existing practices in water 
management. At the same time, transformation is more likely to encounter resistance 
and typically represent less feasible options to decision-makers (Dupuis and Knoepfel 
2013). Moreover, promoting transformation is more at risk of ending up in 
maladaptive options, if the climate and other contextual conditions evolve differently 
than anticipated. 
Robustness and transformation form a continuum of targeted societal change in 
relation to adaptation. While trade-offs are inevitable between the two approaches, 
some scholars argument that they are not mutually exclusive and might in fact be 
complementary (Wise et al. 2014). Robust adaptation can constitute a first response to 
most proximate vulnerabilities while incrementally supporting transformation. How 
such pathway of change can occurred in current water governance structures is an 
open question, since identifying the social-political mechanisms that may conduct to 
these pathways of change needs further research (Gillard et al. 2016 & Van Alstine, 
2016).  
Adaptation hence hardly comes with univocal expectations about the societal goals to 
be reached. This might come as a reason not to consider adaptation as a norm, since 
norms are precisely defined as normative “standard” that leaves a narrow margin of 
interpretation (Axelrod 1986). But one should also recall that contested notions such 
as sustainability can act as global norms, as long as they produce ethics and identities 
that can be appropriated (Lafferty 1996). Even more so in the case of sustainability, 
normative indistinctness allowed for social forces pursuing antagonist interests such 
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as NGOs or business organizations to commonly support sustainability, as an 
objective they could interpret according to their stakes. The uncertainty resulting from 
unclear norms in turn allows a process of translation or “transcoding” (Lascoumes 
1996) through which actors strive to clarify the norm according to their own interests 
and beliefs, in order to strengthen their position in existing policy networks. 
Turning back to adaptation, scholars make the empirical observation that adaptation 
initiatives are discussed almost everywhere, but the values shaping adaptation goals 
differ contextually (Adger et al. 2009). The norm broadness here clearly results in a 
process of norm translation, whereby States and private actors have an important 
leeway in interpreting the meaning of adaptation according to their own values and 
interests. For instance, the Government of India views adaptation as something that 
would be reached through social welfare development, whereas, Switzerland defines 
it as a way to seize the new economic opportunities offered by climate change 
(Dupuis 2015). In a certain sense, adaptation can be considered as a contested norm 
that suffers from polysemy. Goals unclarity is paradoxically turning adaptation into a 
globally attractive policy idea, since it allows government or other policy actors to 
recycle “old wine in new bottles”, and to use adaptation to fuel their own political 
project. 
4 The substantive content of adaptation. The gospel of flexibility and the 
omission of policy and politics 
Norms also carry expectations and prescriptions about the appropriate behaviour to 
adopt, the ought and the ought not, in relation to a given issue. At the policy level, 
norms act as a reference that bounds the choice of desirable rules, instruments and 
procedures by decision-makers (Hall 1993). 
In relation to climate change adaptation, a powerful discourse has emerged in 
scientific as well as in policy circles about the conditions enabling “the good 
governance” of natural resources. Inspired by the work of Nobel prize Elinor Ostrom 
(2005), and by the literature on adaptive management (Olsson, Folke, and Berkes 
2004), these ideas have exerted a strong influence in water policy debates and 
practices, where they often go by the name of “adaptive water governance”.  
Adaptive governance can be traced back to the work of Holling (1973), who strongly 
criticized centralized governance systems, fixed top-down procedures and 
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environmental protection policies for unfitting the complex and non-linear attributes 
of change dynamics in ecosystems. Formal policies that aim to increase the 
predictability of actors’ behaviour by formulating wrongs and rights were viewed as 
too rigid and myopic to manage always evolving ecosystems. Holling argued hat 
“bureaucracies are an exercise in variance reduction through regulation and control”, 
which ultimately contributes to creating bigger environmental problems than the ones 
they were supposed to solve in the first place (Holling and Meffe 1996, 331). 
Decision-making structures deployed in water and natural resources governance were 
also considered as too centralized and hierarchical to leave room for deliberation with 
local stakeholders, what prevents the types of innovative, creative and reactive 
management needed in order to adapt to environmental changes (Holling and 
Gunderson 2002, Holling and Meffe 1996). 
A growing literature sought to use cross-case comparisons and meta-case analysis to 
demonstrate empirical regularities between the features of adaptive governance and 
successful adaptation in the water sector, as well as the lack of adaptive capacity of 
centralized and command and control types of water governance systems (Huntjens et 
al. 2012, Huntjens et al. 2011, Pahl-Wostl 2007, Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014, Pahl-
Wostl et al. 2012 & Nikitina, 2012).  
While this literature prudently recalls that no panacea exists, it strongly asserts that 
successful adaptation is both theoretically and empirically related to the existence of 
flexible institutions that are able to deal with complexity and uncertainty. It is claimed 
this requires new institutional arrangement in many cases. Such institutions would 
combine three features: polycentrism (multilevel and nested structure with many 
centres of decision-making that are formally independent, but interconnected and 
partially redundant); adaptive management system; and strong stakeholders 
participation (Huitema et al. 2009).2  
It is claimed that flexibilizing policies allow for experimenting innovative policy 
solutions and constantly evolving practices based on permanent monitoring and 
knowledge management. Decision-making should occur at the lowest level of 
governance in close collaboration with the higher-levels on cross-scale issues, as to 
                                            
2 According to Huitema (2009), “bioregionalization”, namely the geographical rescaling of governance institutions 
to ecosystem frontiers, constitutes another dimension of these prescriptions. I will not deal with this subject here, 
as the chapter from Arnaud Buchs probably discusses that extensively. 
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allow both social learning across levels, as well as leadership at the individual level 
(Armitage et al. 2008, Lebel et al. 2006). Moreover, these polycentric decision 
networks should facilitate stakeholder participation and the use of local knowledge to 
inform governance choices. All in all, adaptive management in polycentric 
governance settings would facilitate trust-building among water stakeholders, and 
enable the emergence of innovation in response to climate change impacts. 
Adaptive water governance has become the dominant discourse in policy debates on 
climate and water (Reghezza-Zitt et al. 2012). Few scholars have attempted to 
challenge what seems to have become a doxa about the way to bring water 
governance to a climate adaptive state (Huitema et al. 2009, Plummer et al. 2012).  
However, both the conceptual and methodological foundations of the prescriptions 
around adaptive governance remain fragile. Indeed, the implementation of adaptation 
initiatives in the water sector is yet too recent to allow for solid comparative analysis 
and outcomes evaluation (Dupuis and Biesbroek 2013). The empirical studies that 
posit the superiority of adaptive governance use indicators of adaptive capacity such 
as the existence of explicit adaptation strategies or adaptation measures, which 
unfortunately says very little about the effectiveness of these policy outputs to deal 
with climate impacts (Huntjens et al. 2012).  
Another problem relates to the fact that concepts such as polycentrism are complex 
theoretical construct that are difficult to apply to the social reality through easily 
measurable proxies. Existing studies tend to build exaggeratedly clear dichotomies 
between polycentric and centralized system that do not hold in reality. Centralization 
only opposes to decentralization and both systems can be more or less polycentric 
(Pahl-Wostl and Knieper 2014). The normative tone surrounding the debates on 
polycentrism also eludes discussion on the drawback of this model for water 
governance. Polycentrism can well imply higher transaction costs, less accountability, 
and more coordination conflicts than a hierarchical governance with clearly divided 
competence and responsibilities (Huitema et al. 2009). 
Advocacy in favour of adaptive management generally omits to discuss the qualities 
of traditional environmental policy. The formalization of environmental obligations in 
laws and policies impede rapid adaptation, precisely because they seek to make 
fundamental norms such as equal access to natural resources or just redistribution 
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resistant to political changes (Ruhl 2012). Moreover, in many cases, flexibility has 
already become an intrinsic feature of water policy. For instance, the WFD, which is 
nothing less than a top-down policy, stipulates the introduction of water-pricing 
instruments and broad stakeholders participation (Aubin and Varone 2004). In that 
sense, neither formalization nor top-down policy precludes flexible management at 
the lower levels of decision-making (Ebbesson 2010). 
Implementing adaptive management systems can be considered as the principal 
substantive prescription in relation to adaptation. However, it is important to note that 
adaptive governance addresses mainly the structure of governing institutions (the 
polity), whereas it has only little to say about policy instruments, nor does it seem to 
consider politics and power. For example, when the WFD began to be implemented in 
European States, one of the main worries of political scientists concerned the lack of 
policy instruments for influencing water quality in cases where water disturbances 
originate from private owners of adjacent land (Aubin and Varone 2004). In this 
situation, adaptive governance is ill-equipped to advise which of water pricing, 
payment for environmental services or land exchange would be to most “adaptive” or 
effective policy instruments to solve the environmental problem. 
Moreover, the idea of adaptive governance entails a very naïve vision of power 
relations in collective action. A very optimistic view dominates that natural resource 
stakeholders are rational thinkers willing to adopt innovative behaviour and strategies 
to sustain ecosystems, if institutions are correctly designed (Olsson, Folke, and Hahn 
2004). Such perspective omits agency. Collective decision-making is a process 
formed by actors’ interactions that is at least as chaotic and unpredictable as climate 
change. Moreover, social learning is unlikely in polycentric networks of decisions that 
involve highly heterogeneous actors in terms of interest, and a strong degree of power 
fragmentation. One just need to think about the difficulty of finding agreement on 
optimal environmental protection levels between small scale resource users and 
multinational firms, which always have the possibility to opt out (Dupuis and 
Knoepfel 2015, Lima et al. 2006). In such settings, the exercise of hierarchy by public 
authority with democratic legitimacy might represent the only option to reach a 
decision outcome (Knoepfel and Kissling-Naf 1998, Papadopoulos and Warin 2007).  
Finally, in complex social-political systems, implementing adaptive governance in the 
water sector will not necessarily benefit all actors, but implies winners and losers. In 
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Switzerland, the 3rd Rhone correction is a very ambitious project that aims to increase 
the capacity to deal with floods of a return period ranging from 100 to 1000 years. 
The project incorporates features of adaptive governance, notably an emphasis on 
social learning and flexible decision-making (Arborino 2011). Farmers of the region 
strongly opposed the project and felt being prejudiced by it. Indeed, the proposed 
solution to increasing the resilience to flood risks involved using arable land as 
submersible zones. Yet the buildings that surrounding municipalities allowed 
constructing too near from the riverbed will be maintained, although it constitutes the 
main cause of present and future vulnerability.  
As outcomes of water governance reforms always depend to some extent on past 
choices and on the balance of power between local stakeholders, it appears doubtful 
that adaptive governance will universally be perceived as a progress. Enhancing the 
capacity to deal with environmental changes in the water sector is certainly a good 
thing that adaptive governance might be able to do; but simultaneously contributing to 
economic development and social equity in resource access is another, which might 
stay out of hands. Here the case of the 3rd Rhone correction demonstrates, but one 
thing : that an analysis in terms of actors and politics cannot be omitted if the impacts 
of adaptation are to be understood. 
5 Conclusive discussion 
In this chapter, I discussed whether climate change adaptation can be considered as a 
new global norm, and what this is implying for the water sector. I have focused on 
three dimensions of norms, investigating whether adaptation is being institutionalized 
in water governance; what normative content is being conveyed; and whether clear 
substantive prescriptions on the collective behaviour to adopt exist. I have reviewed 
the evidences, drawing from the literature and existing case studies to make the 
following observations. 
First, adaptation acts as a global norm with respects to the fact that signs of 
institutionalization can be distinguished worldwide. However, this process is plagued 
by symbolism and coordination problems, which contributes to producing erratic 
results. 
Second, adaptation has not yet crystallized into a common understanding of the 
societal goals to be reached, but several conceptions coexist. If this indicates that the 
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normative foundation of adaptation still lack solidity, the solubility and broadness of 
the concept actually participate to its attractiveness for policymakers. The diluted 
meaning of adaptation may very well be exploited in politics, as a way for actors to 
legitimate old policy solutions or to consolidate their position in policy networks. 
Third, adaptation conveys strong prescriptions on the need to make water governance 
more flexible, polycentric and participative. Confronted to power and politics in 
concrete decision-making, these advices tend to lose their substance, however. 
In a nutshell, adaptation to climate change can be considered as a global norm that has 
penetrated water governance, but symbolic policymaking, goals unclarity and abstract 
prescriptions contribute to creating erratic outcomes. This situation draws a clear 
research agenda: there is a need to analyse comprehensively adaptation processes in 
the water sector; to develop an in-depth understanding of the pathways of change 
towards adaptive governance; and to advance implementation studies that seek to 
identify common patterns in policy outcomes. Because adaptation has long been the 
poor relation in climate research, it is quite understandable that existing studies 
focused on providing theoretical guidance on adaptation, and on identifying barriers 
and deficits. It is however time to switch from a normative and descriptive agenda 
towards an analytical and explicative one. 
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